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Abstract 
This paper analyses links between intra-organizational adaptation and 
institutional variation across countries. Using the varieties of capitalism 
viewpoint, we examine strategic options open to multinational firms operating 
simultaneously in liberal market economies and coordinated market 
economies. A holistic perspective is achieved by implementing an original 
‘index of institutional impact.’ Data are drawn from a survey of the 
subsidiaries of German firms in the UK in 2007. The results suggest that 
pressure towards accepting local practices for multinational firms varies across 
the dimensions in which firms resolve coordination problems, inciting speedy 
convergence in some, but allowing for maintaining distinctive practices in 
other. 
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Convergence versus Divergence: Testing Varieties of Capitalism 
Perspective on the Globalization of Business Practices 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The last decade witnessed the emergence of a new influential approach to the 
examination of international business that emphasizes the role of the so-called 
social system of production incorporating such institutions as the educational 
system, the system of industrial relation, work organization and other socio-
political factors contributing to the synergies between associations, groups and 
strata, constituting the modern industrial society (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 
1997; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
The important contribution of this concept is in stressing dissimilarities 
between different types of national economic systems (national capitalisms) 
and arguing that this distinction has important consequences in terms of how 
firms operate. This claim has serious implications for the debate on 
globalization, putting pressure on the convergence thesis that alleges that there 
is a single best solution for organizing labour, raw materials and capital in 
order to manufacture and distribute goods. The variety of capitalism (VoC) 
theory points at multiple institutional forces that perpetuate the diversity of 
business systems and the forms of business organization. It is argued that the 
pressures for convergence are counteracted by idiosyncratic national 
institutional arrangements which are the outcome of specific historical 
pathways, interlinked in a complex whole and persistent over time (Hall, 
1986; Lane, 1995; Whitley, 1998). It is further maintained that economic 
openness and international trade reinforce national diversity by encouraging 
each country to specialize in what it does best (Streeck, 1999). 
VoC approach offers a perspective on globalization that goes beyond 
the standard set of strategic choices considered in business literature, which is 
particularly relevant for firms simultaneously operating in two distinct 
institutional settings: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs). Institutional differences between the two, it is 
argued, are big enough to influence the production regime in such major 
aspects as corporate governance and labour relations, organization of skill 
formation and company finance, the rules of company decision making, and 
inter-firm relations (for references see Höpner, 2005, p.333). This is bound to 
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have consequences for multinationals originated in CMEs establishing 
branches in LMEs and vice-versa. There have been attempts in the literature to 
investigate these consequences, but so far analysis was somewhat one-
dimensional, centring on case study evidence, predominantly in the domain of 
human resource management (Ferner and Varul, 2000; Von Glinow et al., 
2002; Tüselmann et al., 2006), but also contracting arrangements (Grimshaw 
and Miozzo, 2006), competence development and learning practices (Geppert, 
2005), and work systems and manufacturing approaches (Geppert et al., 
2003). 
This article is different. Our approach to company adaptation is holistic 
rather than focused on any specific aspect of business organization and relies 
on a newly devised ‘index of institutional impact’ and related analytical tools 
designed to achieve quantitative rather than just qualitative results. Using 
original survey data, we employ the index of institutional impact to reveal the 
degree to which subsidiaries are prone to adapt to the host-country’s 
institutional framework. We investigate the operation of German subsidiaries 
in the UK. Our choice is informed by the fact that in the VoC literature Britain 
is customarily described as a foremost exponent of LME and Germany as the 
quintessential case of CME (Hall and Soskice, 2001). By choosing to look at 
parent firms and their subsidiaries we sought to increase the rigor of our 
analysis because these two categories of firms have a greater inherent potential 
to be very similar in business practices than any other two groups of firms. 
  By introducing the index of institutional impact we seek to achieve 
four main objectives. First, to establish whether companies acting in 
archetypal LME and CME settings truly exhibit the stereotypical 
characteristics that VoC literature accredits to them. Second, to gain a clearer 
picture of how organizational practices in subsidiaries differ from those in 
parent companies with a view to measuring the impact of business 
environment on business practices. Third, to unravel the forces and conditions 
that hinder or promote adaptation processes. Fourth, to identify elements of 
firm behaviour that are particularly sensitive to the influence of the host 
country institutional environment. This approach allows us to develop and test 
a number of hypotheses relevant to the debate on global convergence. 
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CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Varieties of Capitalism 
When dealing with the ultimate effect of globalisation on national production 
regimes scholars offer a plethora of different predictions ranging from 
imminent global convergence of business practices (Thatcher, 2004) to the 
perpetuation of the diversity of social systems of production (Crouch and 
Streeck, 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Schmidt, 2002). 
Within the rather wide spectrum of global convergence literature Hall 
and Soskice’s (2001) VoC paradigm has established itself as one of the most 
influential conceptual frameworks characterizing the impact of institutions on 
convergence from a firm-centred perspective (Deeg and Jackson, 2007). It 
distinguishes between two systemic equilibriums – coordinated market 
economy (CME), such as that of Germany or the Scandinavian countries, and 
liberal market economy (LME), such as that of the Anglo-Saxon countries, – 
on the basis of five ‘coordination dimensions.’ They are: the industrial 
relations system, which determines the regulation of wages, working 
conditions and organizations representing labour and other employees; the 
employee relations regime that affects such domains as information sharing 
and employee representation; the system of training and education that 
governs the scope and availability of workforce skills and determines 
incentives to invest in general, industry- and firm-specific skills; the corporate 
governance system, which conditions firms’ access to different sources of 
external finance and the time horizon they adopt when planning investments; 
and finally the system of inter-firm relations, which is crucial for industry 
standard setting, regulating poaching of workers and technological exchange. 
These dimensions are interdependent and generate institutional 
complementarities. 
 
Implications for Adaptation Processes 
A major theoretical contribution of VoC literature is establishing a link 
between comparative institutional advantages and economic outcomes. VoC 
theory maintains that institutional variation across nations is an important 
factor influencing firm behaviour and business practices because institutions 
are critical in determining the quality of the relationships the firm is able to 
establish internally (with own employees) and externally (with suppliers, 
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clients, stakeholders, trade unions, business associations and governments) 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.6). By introducing the idea of institutional 
complementarity (i.e., a specific interplay of institutions that create benefits in 
terms of corporate governance, labour relations, financial regimes, etc. that 
would not exist if the configuration of the institutional environment were 
different (Aoki, 2001)) as a powerful formative force, the VoC paradigm 
potentially adds new depth to the conventional explanations of the external 
expansion of firms provided by mainstream business literature. However, in its 
standard form this paradigm does not deal with this issue explicitly and does 
not scrutinize specifically situations in which companies establish branches in 
an institutional environment that contrasts with the environment of their home 
country.  
In principle, foreign branches may either emulate their parent 
companies, or adopt the behavioural pattern dominant among businesses in the 
host economy, or implement a model that combines the elements of the two 
archetypes of the market economy. Hall and Soskice (2001) give a general 
indication as to which pattern may prevail by pointing out that multinational 
corporations (MNCs) would seek to take advantage of the opportunities and 
incentives provided by the local institutional framework in the distribution of 
their activities. The basic arguments of VoC theory suggest two important 
assumptions that may be used to construct a number of hypotheses for 
comparative analysis. 
The first one addresses the issue of why foreign firms would be willing 
to adapt at all. According to VoC theory, prevailing institutional settings shape 
corporate strategy and, eventually, cost advantages. Accordingly, efficiency-
maximizing firms will gravitate ‘toward the mode of coordination for which 
there is institutional support’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p.9). It can be deduced 
from this that firms, among other reasons, may establish operations in other 
types of capitalist systems in order to benefit from some particular aspect of 
the production regime that this system offers and that is absent or ineffective 
in the home-country because of the lack of institutional support. Indeed there 
is evidence in literature that this has become a growing phenomenon known as 
‘institutional arbitrage’ (Jackson and Deeg, 2008). 
The second assumption deals with a wider context of adaptation stimuli 
faced by foreign companies abroad. This context reflects the fact that 
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‘countries exhibit distinct, historically determined national institutional 
equilibria that tie together a number of elements (such as the industrial 
relations, financial, corporate governance and vocational training systems) in a 
coherent fashion’ (Fioretos, 2001, p.219; see also: Crouch and Streeck, 1997; 
Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). Hence, a foreign company willing to exploit 
institutional arbitrage existing between the home and the host country is likely 
to discover that the efficiency and strategic importance of a particular 
institution depends in fact on the whole subsystem of complementary 
institutional arrangements that this company will also have to embrace 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
Whether in pursuit of returns on institutional arbitrage or seeking to 
extract benefits from institutional complementarity, multinational firms can be 
expected, on the strength of this analysis, to encourage the adaptation process 
within their foreign branches. VoC theory, therefore, implicitly predicts that 
firms originating in CMEs and operating in LMEs (and vice versa) will face 
over time weighty reasons to adapt to the institutional setting of the host 
country. 
 
An Alternative Perspective on Adaptation Processes 
There is a substantial body of literature that explicitly or implicitly contradicts 
the adaptation hypothesis suggested by the VoC concept. Fenton-O’Creevy 
and co-authors (2008) argue that the response of multinational firms to host 
country institutional pressures will lie on a continuum from compliance, 
through compromise, to avoidance and defiance, depending on the balance of 
benefits and disadvantages associated with local institutional constraints. 
Indeed, writings on the comparative institutional analyses of industrial and 
employee relations provide evidence that, in fact, country-of-origin and host-
country business characteristics usually blend together when companies 
operate in foreign institutional settings (Ferner and Varul, 2000). What makes 
this evidence particularly noteworthy in the context of this paper is that HR 
management is especially deeply embedded in the national legal and cultural 
contexts, making it arguably more susceptible to following the adaptation 
route comparing with the management of, say, technology, finance or 
marketing. In so doing, multinational companies may be in a position to create 
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their own tailor-made quasi-institutional environments, integrating best 
practice from their home base and the host-country market systems when 
institutions existing in the host-country prove unhelpful. Or, as Dunning and 
Bansal (1997) put it, the effect of a subsidiary’s national culture is moderated 
by the unequivocal organizational culture, as evolved from its distinctive 
home-country setting. Therefore, and in the context of our two-country study, 
Hypothesis 1: Companies expanding their businesses into other 
capitalisms adopt a mixed business form, combining adaptation to 
local conditions and the preservation of certain imported elements. 
 
Drivers of Adaptation Processes 
Studies in international business contain references to a wide range of firm-
specific drivers and motivations of adaptation processes within the foreign 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) (see, for example, Fenton-
O’Creevy et al., 2008). We have chosen subsidiary size, age and operational 
function as the three variables that, on the one hand, have a direct and 
significant impact on adaptation whilst, on the other hand, are readily 
available and fit easily the requirements of quantitative analysis.  
 Researchers concur that the size of the subsidiary is of considerable 
importance for adaptation processes, but often disagree about consequences. 
One view is that large subsidiaries are usually established by large firms that 
attempt to leverage practices on a worldwide basis, which makes it difficult to 
see their institutional possibilities as being constrained by their countries of 
location (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2008). It is also argued that for some bigger 
subsidiaries there is little reason to adapt as firms can use their option to exit 
in order to ‘shop’ among national economies and locate their activity in the 
institutional context most congenial for them, as well as lobby for change in 
those institutions (Streeck, 1997; Fluck and Mayer, 2005). By contrast, some 
authors, in line with the VoC approach, believe that subsidiaries with large 
operation are likely to adapt to a greater extent. This may happen because big 
subsidiaries have a higher profile and as a result come under more severe 
public scrutiny and attract greater attention from local authorities, making 
them more eager to ‘blend’ into the local institutional environment (Luo, 
2006). It may be further expected that ‘the more a company’s key assets and 
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activities are located in a distinctive and different environment from its 
domestic one, the more likely it will adapt its structures and strategies to the 
prevalent pattern in that type of business system’ (Whitley, 1998, p.464). 
Finally, bigger subsidiaries are more probable to have the necessary 
economies to have their own policies, for example, a subsidiary with its own 
human resource department is more probable to pursue a self-reliant 
employment policy. We seek to contribute to this debate by testing the 
hypothesis that 
Hypothesis 2: Larger subsidiaries of foreign firms show more 
alignment with the norms of the host country 
 We further seek to establish how the purpose of entry into a foreign market 
as represented by the business profile (‘operational function’) of a particular 
MNC’s subsidiary influences the adaptation patterns within this subsidiary 
across the five ‘coordination dimensions’ which we scrutinize in this study. As 
has been demonstrated in literature, different characteristics of a host country 
would induce a firm to establish subsidiaries with different functions 
(Kuemmerle, 1999), which in turn may either stimulate or hinder the progress 
of adaptation. Although not immune to institutional features of both home and 
host countries, production subsidiaries of MNCs originating in highly 
coordinated business systems, like Germany, appear to be particularly reliant 
on context specific manufacturing strategies (Geppert and Matten, 2006) and 
therefore are likely to be less receptive to local practices. This stance is further 
reinforced by the accepted view in the FDI literature that industrial FDI occurs 
when firms seek to exploit firm-specific capabilities in foreign environments. 
In this case the investor may be expected to reproduce within its branch the 
winning practices even if they are not fully supported by the institutional 
setting in the host country. By contrast, firms that set up non-production 
subsidiaries go abroad to ensure proximity to customers or to exploit the 
advantages of the local market and are likely to be more receptive to host 
institutional inputs. Hence we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Subsidiaries of multinational companies which are not 
production facilities show more alliance with the norms in the host 
country than production subsidiaries.  
We finally seek to establish whether adaptation is a function of the time a 
subsidiary has been operating in a foreign institutional environment. The 
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variable ‘subsidiary age’ is key to convergence research within the VoC 
framework which implies that sooner or later foreign firms may be inclined to 
fully adapt to the local institutional setup in order to maximize the benefits of 
institutional complementarity. With time foreign subsidiaries are likely to 
become more entwined with indigenous stakeholders such as regional 
authorities, locally recruited personnel, and the local community and, 
consequently, show gravitation toward ‘local ways of doing things.’ If this 
assumption is correct,1 then the time factor would contribute to divergence 
rather than convergence of parent-subsidiary business practices. Hence we test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Subsidiaries that were established a long time ago 
show more conformity with the norms in the host country 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The Sample 
The empirical foundation of our study is a postal survey of German 
subsidiaries in the UK based on the March 2006 edition of the database 
‘German Subsidiary Companies in the United Kingdom’ compiled by the 
German-British Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BGCC). With 1,320 
entries this is the most comprehensive database of such type.  
 The VoC centres on production regimes. However, this does not rule 
out non-industrial firms from examination (Hiscox and Rickard, 2002). Hall 
and Soskice (2001, p.6) see firms as actors with ‘capacities for developing, 
producing, and distributing goods and services [our italics – authors] 
profitably...’ In literature there are examples of extending VoC analysis to 
distribution and sales (Croucher et al., 2006; Farndale et al., 2008) and 
services (Faulconbridge, 2008). At the same time, VoC theory mostly ignores 
governmental organizations, banks and other financial institutions. 
Accordingly, we keep in our sample firms in such sectors as transportation, 
construction, agricultural, distribution, etc., but exclude financial firms and 
firms completely or partially owned by the government. Further one hundred 
companies had to be taken out at a later stage because their addresses turned 
out to be invalid. Ultimately the survey target population was set at 1,133. 
A pre-tested questionnaire was sent to CEO, COO or Head of 
Corporate Development of the sampled subsidiary firms and enquired about 
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business characteristics present in both subsidiary and parent firms. Potential 
respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality in treating their 
responses. A total of 149 usable replies were received, generating the response 
rate of 13.2%. While this rate is lower than would be desired, it is quite typical 
for large-scale mail survey research (Dillman, 2000; De Pelsmacker and 
Janssens, 2007). We were unable to do a follow-up mailing to non-
respondents because of the condition of anonymity. 
To compensate for a relatively low response rate we paid special 
attention to verifying the representativeness of the responses we received. We 
compared the profile of responded firms with the profile of all German 
subsidiaries in the UK in terms of the number of employees, subsidiary age 
and the sector of operation. For the first two parameters the profiles proved to 
be very similar whilst the share of manufacturing firms among our 
respondents was lower than in the BGCC database (45.0% against 63.8%). 
However, consequent analysis showed that the bias from the under-
representation of manufacturing firms was such that it only strengthened any 
significant correlations that we detected. One other limitation of the survey 
was its reliance exclusively on respondents working in subsidiaries rather than 
parent companies. This design was chosen because the anonymity provisions 
would not allow us to match parent firms with their subsidiaries. There is 
evidence that justifies our approach. First, the respondents were employees 
who, because of their position within the company (COO, CEO, Head of 
Corporate Development), can be expected with a great degree of certainty to 
be suitably cognizant of business practices of the parent firm. Second, the fact 
that some questions related to parent firms were left unanswered suggests that 
respondents were careful to provide information which they believed to be 
reliable. Finally, we considered the likelihood that the nationality of the 
respondents (local or German) could have affected the feedback due to 
differences in experience and backgrounds. We found no such evidence for the 
firms in our sample.  
 
Index of Institutional Impact   
To position our respondents within the reference points of VoC theory we 
conceived and designed an original ‘index of institutional impact’. Novel in 
this research field, this index makes it possible to convert the qualitative 
 11 
characteristics of subsidiary and parent companies into a format that can be 
used in quantitative analysis.  
*** Draw Table 1 about here *** 
The index of institutional impact (S_INST for subsidiary and P_INST 
for parent firms) is calculated by attributing the value of one for each of 25 
business characteristics (Table 1) that the VoC paradigm sets out as typical for 
firms in coordinated market economies and therefore has the range from zero 
to 252. We treated each characteristic as a dependent variable. The 25 
variables, each bearing equal weight following the conventions of the VoC 
theory (Gaur et al., 2007), were split into five major operational domains - 
industrial relations (IR), training and education (TE), employee relations (ER), 
corporate governance (CG), and inter-firm relations (IFR) - each containing 
five characteristics. It is important to stress at this stage that the archetypical 
LME firm as well as the archetypical CME firm is an abstraction. The VoC 
concept in its description of the archetypical firm synthesizes the most typical 
features of a relevant type of capitalism, which in reality are likely to be 
spread across a number of firms with the consequence that the maximum 
institutional impact score is improbable to be shown by any particular 
company. Every German firm may not quite fit the VoC description of CME 
and yet on the whole, according to Hall and Soskice, there is no better 
example of CME in Europe than Germany because in this country certain 
relations between firms, investors and stakeholders are sufficiently dominant 
(although not necessarily universal) to distinguish the production regime there 
from certain other countries in a substantial way. The abstract nature of the 
LME/CME firm has prompted us to use in this paper maximum theoretical 
scores of 0 and 1 as descriptors for every coordination dimension rather than 
finding out the actual score for every characteristic in, for example, UK as a 
representative of LME by looking at a sample of British companies. 
Establishing methodology for creating such a sample is a challenging research 
procedure in its own right, which, to our knowledge, has not yet been 
comprehensively addressed in the literature. Consequently, in this study a 
score of zero in a particular category signifies that, in terms of this activity, the 
firm fits perfectly the description of an archetypical LME firm; the score of 
five portrays an archetypical CME pattern. The overall score of zero implies 
that the business practices of the firm in question were entirely in harmony 
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with such practices as attributed by the VoC theory to the archetypal LME 
firm. Respectively, the index of 25 positions the company overall as an 
archetypal CME firm.  
To calculate this index it was necessary to have valid responses 
covering each of the 25 characteristics. As described earlier, in reality several 
respondents missed out some of the required characteristics. To address this 
deficiency we introduced an alternative version of our institutional index 
called ‘institutional impact ratio’ (S_INST_RATIO for each subsidiary and 
P_INST_RATIO for each parent firm). This was formed by adding one for 
every valid response and then dividing the sum by total number of responses 
for each of five categories. The range of the impact ratio is from zero to one. 
For example, if out of five characteristics constituting the category ‘industrial 
relations’ a respondent provided information about only three characteristics, 
which were encoded as 1, 1 and 0, the value of the ratio for ‘industrial 
relations’ would equal 2:3=0.67. As with the index of institutional impact, a 
zero impact ratio indicated that the business practices of the company 
corresponded to the LME archetype, and five to the CME archetype. The 
introduction of the impact ratio increased the number of responses which 
could be used in our quantitative analysis, increasing the statistical power of 
our findings. 
When calculated for an individual firm, both indices can be used as 
indicators of how close firm behaviour is to the ideal LME or CME type of 
behaviour and therefore serve as a measure of adaptation by foreign firms to 
the host-country environment. Also, the indices make it possible to evaluate in 
quantitative terms the degree of adjustment in each of the five categories 
described above, rather than to describe in qualitative terms adaptation in 
individual business dimensions, to which prior research has been constrained. 
 
Explanatory Variables and Controls 
Variables and controls are described in Table 2. Hypothesis H2 requires the 
introduction of firm size as an explanatory parameter. We measure firm size 
through the natural logarithm of the total number of employees in the parent 
firm (P_FIRMSIZE) and subsidiary (S_FIRMSIZE) at the time of survey. Our 
hypotheses further suggest that the dynamics of the adaptation process may be 
associated with the firm’s age and the subsidiary’s function. We establish 
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explanatory variable LOG_S_AGE and control variable LOG_P_AGE 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the subsidiary 
and parent, respectively, were founded. By applying logarithmic 
transformations we ensure a tighter spread of variables and prevent extreme 
outliers from distorting our results. To account for subsidiary operational 
function, we establish the variable S_PROD that takes the value of one if the 
subsidiary acts as a production facility (the reference category is OTHER that 
includes all non-industrial facilities, e.g. research and development, after-sale 
services, distribution, etc). We include S_PROD because non-production 
facilities may not be exposed to all sub-spheres of the institutional system as 
much as production facilities. Comparing to production facilities they may 
therefore not have similar incentives to adapt in certain domains. 
*** Draw Table 2 about here *** 
Our literature review indicated that the dynamics of the adaptation 
process may be influenced by the intensity of parent-subsidiary interaction 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005) and industry 
affiliation (Gepert and Matten 2006). Consequently, we use S_REPRESENT 
to control for relative intensity of representation of parent company 
individuals in subsidiary management, line management and staff. As Moore 
(2006) explains, expatriates are not simply tools of control by headquarters, 
but have the capacity for strategic choice or can be led by subsidiary-
determinism in subverting HQ policies. The index is formed by adding one for 
each of the following: (a) subsidiary management is not recruited exclusively 
locally but at least partly installed by the parent firm, (b) parent company 
representatives can be found on the subsidiary's management board, (c) parent 
firm representatives hold line management functions in the subsidiary firm, 
and (d) parent company representatives are among subsidiary staff other than 
management. A higher index implies stronger parent company involvement in 
subsidiaries’ day-to-day activities. What is more, we create a dummy for 
subsidiary’s relative financial dependence on the parent firm (S_FINNEED). It 
equals one if in financial years 2004-2006 the subsidiary experienced negative 
net earnings and/or had to overcome temporary liquidity shortages through 
bridge financing provided by the parent firm. We include S_FINNEED to 
control for the possibility that economic performance empowers local 
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management in their ability to make strategic choices independent of the 
parent firm. 
To control for industry affiliation, we assign the value of one to 
dummy variable S_MANUF to firms in the manufacturing sector (the 
reference category was ‘services and other’; we decided on having just two 
categories, manufacturing and service, after tests of various industry dummies 
in our regressions showed no significant results). As an additional check for 
the internationality of the parent firm we also introduce P_COUNTRIES, a 
measure of the number of countries in which MNCs operate. 
 
Parent firms/subsidiaries comparison 
Despite obvious advantages the comparison of practices in parent firms and 
subsidiaries is not altogether problem free. Some practices may diverge due to 
differences in the functions and the levels of authority that exist between the 
parent and its subsidiaries, rather than the differences in institutional 
characteristics of the operational environment. These differences appear to be 
particularly prominent with reference to parameters that the VoC theory 
includes in the coordination dimension corporate governance ,CG) and inter 
firm relations (IFR), although the views in the literature vary. If we take CG as 
an example, available studies give a mixed picture of the scope of the 
involvement of foreign subsidiaries and often ‘raise more questions than they 
answer’ (Costello and Costello, 2004). On the one hand, there is an opinion 
that the CG powers of subsidiaries are small and even diminishing (see Kiel et 
al., 2006 for details). On the other, some publications maintain that German 
subsidiaries abroad in many cases are ‘no longer of the “transplant” type’ as 
they are encouraged to take more responsibilities in order to ‘maximize the 
exploitation of local idiosyncrasies’ and ‘make efforts to become recognized 
as local by the adopted region’ (Lane, 2000). 
Under these circumstances in order to increase the validity of our 
research we have chosen to undertake additional tests in the robustness section 
that address the possible discrepancy in functions and responsibilities between 
parent firms and their subsidiaries.  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Simple Statistics 
Tables 3 and 4 provide the statistical foundation for two general observations 
particularly important to the topic of this paper. First, with the mean 
institutional impact index of 11.26 (or 0.45 in its ratio specification) German 
subsidiaries in the UK achieve notably lower scores than their German parents 
(16.79 impact score or 0.69 ratio). The differences are statistically significant 
(at P0.01) and consistent across all index categories. These results 
demonstrate that, in VoC terms, the behavioural pattern of subsidiaries in our 
sample is closer to the archetypal LME kind of firm than their respective 
parent firms, thus supporting H1 and suggesting that multinational firms 
respond to institutional forces existing in the host countries. 
The second important observation from Tables 3 and 4 is that institutional 
impact scores vary significantly for each of the five categories of business 
characteristics set out by the VoC paradigm. This finding emphasizes the point 
made earlier that the study of adaptation processes should not be restricted to 
just one particular coordination dimension, but requires a comprehensive 
approach. Our data show that the greatest difference between German firms 
and their British subsidiaries is in the industrial relations and inter-firm 
relations categories. This result does not come as a surprise since industrial 
and inter-firm relations are particularly dependent on such institutions as 
industry-wide employers associations and trade unions, which historically are 
more prevalent in Germany than in Britain (Rigby et al., 2004). By contrast, 
parent and subsidiary practices emerge as least dissimilar in index score in the 
sphere of employee relations, highlighting the pervasive nature of the co-
operative employee relations style typical of CME capitalism as described in 
HRM literature (Dickmann, 2003). However, in our sample subsidiaries show 
distinctly different structures of employee participation when compared to 
their parent firms. Works council or comparable employee representation body 
are either absent or exist in a much abridged form. There is no board level 
representation of employees. At the same time, British subsidiaries proved 
more prone than their German headquarters to make use of such cooperative 
practices as performance-related pay schemes, and employee consultation and 
suggestion schemes. The validity of parent-subsidiary comparison within the 
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domain of inter-firm relations (IFR) may cause doubts reflecting the fact that 
the role of the parent firm is by default significantly different from the role of 
the subsidiary. To address this concern we surveyed a small control sample of 
British parent firms and their German subsidiaries. We found that for our 
control sample IFR scores for parents and subsidiaries were very similar in 
marked contrast to our results for German parents and subsidiaries. This result 
increases the likelihood that IFR score differentials are predominantly driven 
by non role-related factors. 
*** Draw Table 3 about here *** 
To address H2 we group subsidiaries according to the number of 
employees (S_FIRMSIZE) relative to the sample median value (Table 4, Panel 
A). We classify firms as ‘big’ if subsidiary size is above the sample median 
subsidiary size, and as ‘small’ if otherwise. Across all index categories and for 
both versions of the institutional impact index, the scores for ‘small’ 
subsidiaries are distinctly lower than the scores for ‘big’ subsidiaries. This 
evidence contradicts H2. The differences are statistically significant (at 
P0.01) for the overall index, as well as for industrial relations, training and 
education, and inter-firm relations categories. There are a number of possible 
explanations. First, smaller firms could be more dependent on local conditions 
while bigger firms are likely to be more exposed to supranational public 
scrutiny and legislation. Thus, European Works Council Directives and other 
harmonized regulation across the EU are usually mandatory exclusively for 
companies fulfilling certain minimum size criteria but voluntary for others. 
Second, subsidiaries of smaller size are more likely to be set up by smaller 
parent firms which are also likely to lack the scope of internationalization that 
allows deriving efficiencies from operating centralized IR, ER, or TE 
schemes.  
*** Draw Table 4 about here *** 
Calculations in Panel B of Table 4 are similar to those in Panel A, except 
that now we categorize subsidiaries according to their operational function 
(S_PROD). We establish two categories: a) production subsidiaries and b) 
other. For both index specifications and across all index categories except 
corporate governance the latter have markedly lower index scores than 
production facilities. The results are statistically significant for the overall 
index, as well as for industrial relations, training and education, and inter-firm 
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relations. These revealed differences are noteworthy because the VoC theory 
suggests that they are particularly relevant to defining and maintaining CME 
context specific manufacturing strategies in an LME setting. These findings 
support H3 and are in line with the view expressed in literature that 
multinational firms, when establishing production abroad, could seek to take 
advantage of firm-specific capabilities rather than to pursue the benefits 
associated with institutional complementarity. By contrast, the lower index 
scores for non-production facilities indicate that firms that set up these 
subsidiaries go abroad to exploit the advantages of the local market and 
therefore are more amenable to host institutional influences.  
 In Panel C of Table 4 we examine whether branches that were 
established for a longer period of time show more conformity with local rules. 
We classify firms as ‘established’ if the age of the subsidiary (LOG_S_AGE) 
is above the sample median subsidiary age, and as ‘new’ if otherwise. 
According to our data, for both index specifications and across all index 
categories except corporate governance ‘established’ UK subsidiaries exhibit 
higher institutional index scores than ‘new’ firms, i.e., ‘established’ 
subsidiaries are closer to the home (German) model than ‘new’ firms. This 
result is statistically significant for the index overall in its ratio specification 
(at P0.05), the industrial relations (at P0.01) and inter-firm relations 
categories (at P0.05). This finding is weakly supportive of convergence 
arguments and contradicts H4 because it suggests that the country of origin 
effect does not weaken over time.  
 
Regression Analysis 
The presence of correlation between firm size, age and subsidiary operational 
function (see Appendix 1 for the table of correlations) required that the results 
of simple statistical analysis be tested for ‘omitted variable bias’. 
Consequently, we applied multiple regression analysis with subsidiary 
institutional impact index scores as dependent variable. We did two series of 
calculations: one with the difference between parent and subsidiary 
institutional index scores as dependent variables and the other with subsidiary 
institutional impact index scores as dependent variable. The results were 
broadly similar, so we report the outcomes of the second series (Table 5). For 
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all cumulative index scores and each individual index category we tested for 
hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 by setting explanatory variables to subsidiary size, 
subsidiary age, subsidiary operational function, parent-subsidiary interaction, 
subsidiary industry classification, and the relative power that company internal 
practices exert over host country institutional forces, as represented by parent 
institutional impact index scores. We subjected our regressions to a set of 
control variables as described earlier. It is worth mentioning that in terms of 
R-squared the explanatory power of our regressions compares favorably with 
similar research done previously by other authors (see, for example, 
Tüselmann et al., 2006). 
*** Draw Table 5 about here *** 
Across all index categories the explanatory variable age (LOG_S_AGE) is 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for subsidiary age in Panel A has 
negative sign for the overall index, and all index categories except industrial 
relations and inter-firm relations. This may be interpreted as tentative evidence 
that German-owned UK subsidiaries replace some CME-like routines 
characteristic of the German institutional environment with LME-like routines 
akin the British pattern as they mature thus confirming H4. However we are 
reluctant to make far reaching conclusions because the results in Panel B are 
more ambiguous. 
The impact of subsidiary size (S_FIRMSIZE) is statistically significant (at 
P0.01) and positive for one or both forms of the institutional impact index for 
all dependent variables except for employee relations and corporate 
governance. The results are consistent with our earlier findings from Table 3 
in that they contradict H2: bigger subsidiaries are farther from the archetypal 
LME procedures in terms of industrial relations, training and education, and 
inter-firm relations, other things equal. At the same time, subsidiary size does 
not add meaningfully to the explanation of subsidiaries’ employee relations 
practices and only weakly (at P0.10) influences subsidiary approaches to 
corporate governance. 
For subsidiary operational function (S_PROD) the overall institutional 
index is statistically significant for both the index of institutional impact (at 
P0.05) and the ratio of institutional impact (at P0.10). This signifies that 
production subsidiaries demonstrate quite a significant tendency to operate in 
line with the German business model in particular in terms of industrial 
 19 
relations and training and education categories. At the same time the outcomes 
for the category OTHER are more ambiguous and difficult to interpret. 
The results for the variable P_INST (parent institutional index) deserve a 
special mention. This index has particularly strong statistical significance (at 
P0.01) in relation to such dependent variables as employee relations, training 
and education, and corporate governance in subsidiaries, exactly the variables 
that we previously found least dependent on subsidiary size and age. This 
confirms our earlier inference that the influence of parent firms’ practices is 
likely to be the strongest in these three categories because of their importance 
for maintaining coordination within organizations. At the same time the 
statistical insignificance of P_INST for industrial relations and inter-firm 
relations may be interpreted as suggesting that in these categories host country 
institutional determinants prevail over firms internal practices in shaping 
business routines, although more research is needed to arrive at firm 
conclusions. 
 
Robustness 
In this subsection we briefly describe the results from our robustness checks. 
We had a number of concerns to deal with. 
One of them was that our size variables S_FIRMSIZE and 
P_FIRMSIZE could be biased towards just one aspect of firm’s operation, the 
number of employees. Consequently, we introduced turnover figures as a 
financial proxy for company size. We established that such substitution did not 
change our results; in fact with this choice of specification they turned out to 
be even more statistically significant. 
To address our concern that the responses might be biased by the 
nationality of the respondent we looked at correlation between the parent-
subsidiary interaction variable S_REPRESENT (on the assumption that higher 
scores increases the likelihood that an expatriate is on the board or in a 
management position and responded to the survey) and the subsidiary 
institutional index scores. No significant correlation was revealed. 
The next check was to see how our results would be affected by the 
exclusion of small and micro firms from the sample. This was necessary to 
address the opinion existing in literature that firms with very few employees 
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were likely to behave in an unorthodox manner (Tüselmann et al., 2006). 
Consequently, we repeated our analysis for the sample that included only 
firms with the number of employees of 21 and above. Again, the results we 
obtained were very similar to the ones presented in the previous section. 
Finally, we checked for the consequences of differences in functions 
and levels of authority that may exist between the parent and its subsidiaries. 
After studying the literature we identified two VoC coordination dimensions – 
intra firm relations (IFR) and corporate governance (CG) – as those where 
such differences are most likely to happen. We tested the validity of our 
approach by dropping in the robustness tests some elements of the IFR and 
CG, for which, according to the literature, a direct comparison between 
parents and subsidiaries was least appropriate. Subsequently, for IFR we 
retained all elements except ‘cross-shareholdings with companies other than 
parent/subsidiary’, whereas for CG only two elements were retained: ‘more 
attention is paid to the long term objectives rather than to current earnings’ 
and ‘banks are an important source of financing’. The test did not challenge 
our results.   
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Multinational firms can make the most of their strategic and operating 
characteristics if they have full understanding of the options open to them. A 
central contribution of this paper is the insight into the impact of institutional 
differences on organisational behaviour of transnational corporations. For the 
first time the examination is based on quantitative analysis rather than case 
studies or anecdotal evidence. This approach makes it possible to gain a 
clearer picture of how organizational practices in subsidiaries differ from those 
in parent companies as a result of the impact of the business environment. The 
analytical framework we put forward presents a useful tool for executives with 
which to think about the firm’s relative position on the continuum from host to 
home country practices; it may inform executives seeking to take actions 
necessary to adjust firm practices to achieve greater congruency with either 
internal practices of the parent firm or host country practices. We have been 
also able to identify elements of firm behaviour that are particularly sensitive 
to the influence of the host country institutions.  
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 The VoC theory, by stressing the role of national institutions and the 
power of institutional complementarity, puts into question the assertion that 
the world is drifting into a global equilibrium of business practices. Our 
objective was to establish whether business practices of multinational firms 
operating across various types of capitalisms really differ as suggested by the 
VoC paradigm. We achieved this by comparing the organizational behaviour 
of parent firms in Germany (CME) and their subsidiaries in the UK (LME). 
The chosen comparison, therefore, represented a very demanding test of the 
‘power’ of national institutional system in which this ‘power’ was confronted 
with the ‘power’ of intra-organizational quasi institutional set-ups that exist 
within international firms. Although based on a two-country comparison, our 
findings can be generalised for a wide population of MNCs simultaneously 
operating in CMEs and LMEs, because of the country and industry 
specificities of the selected samples. 
Our results reveal the existence of two rivalling forces that have 
unequal influence on the different spheres of firm coordination. First, German 
affiliates in the UK exhibit significantly different behaviour from their parents 
across all five domains which we scrutinized, confirming the existence of 
distinct systemic institutional forces as described by the many contributors to 
VoC literature. Second, the relative alignment of firm behaviour with 
institutional practices in the host country is mediated by factors internal to the 
firm, such as age, size and subsidiary function. We showed that corporate 
governance, employee relations and training and education in subsidiaries are 
predominantly driven by parent firm routines and less so by host country 
institutional setup. By contrast, industrial and inter-firm relations in 
subsidiaries are profoundly influenced by determinants inherent in host 
country institutions. 
The finding that the degree of adaptation is different across the main 
coordination dimensions is evidence that institutional complementarity may 
not be as strong a factor as far as adaptation to national conditions is 
concerned as is suggested in the VoC theory. Kenworthy (2006) already 
challenged VoC's claims about the consequences of institutional 
complementarities having examined the macroeconomic performance effects 
(e.g. GDP growth) attributable to institutional complementarities. Our 
research, however, is different because it focuses on micro-level effects. We 
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have found that at firm level adaptation to the national institutional setup is not 
full and not uniform across coordination dimensions. This sheds doubt on the 
complementarity argument in its strong form and suggests that a less static and 
more dynamic variant of VoC theory is needed to address the complexities of 
micro relations. 
A tentative interpretation of our results may be that managers seek to 
achieve, through a varying degree of institutional adaptation, an equilibrium 
where the marginal cost of adaptation just equals the marginal cost of 
preservation. Implications for global convergence are twofold. On the one 
hand, MNCs appear to draw upon the elements of institutional arrangements 
that belong to different systems of capitalism to build a preferred quasi-
institutional setting of their own at the company level thus perpetuating certain 
characteristic elements of differing institutional arrangements. On the other 
hand, as more and more firms operate internationally it may be assumed that 
the ‘pure’ forms of corporate conduct as described by VoC construct will be 
progressively eroded over time. Identification of dynamic institutional 
elements has significant implications for executives responsible for 
international strategy and operations. Performance enhancement may be 
achievable for the multinational firm if operations are continuously 
streamlined analogously to developments in the institutional environment. 
Similarly, converging institutional elements across market economies may 
make previously unavailable standardization of operational elements possible 
that can be drivers of economies of scale and cost reductions. 
Only through the analysis of the individual elements of institutional 
environments will scholars forward an agenda that provides strong managerial 
guidance in international business environments in which institutional change 
abounds. This paper presented such an analysis. However, the complexities 
and evolution of the interaction between local institutions and foreign firms 
requires further attention. More research is needed to account for factors that 
we did not include in our consideration, for example, the existence of two 
types of foreign subsidiaries, ‘greenfields’ and ‘brownfields’; the influence 
that the harmonization of the European and international legislation may have 
on the adjustment of firms to foreign institutional contexts. Future research 
should also try to link the purpose of German firms establishing subsidiaries in 
the UK to their adaptation behaviour for additional insights beyond the 
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quantitative analysis presented in this paper. Furthermore, the index of 
institutional impact introduced in this paper opens the perspective of a time-
series analysis of behavioural changes revealed by the subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations operating within different social systems of 
production – eventually allowing for even more incisive insights into 
convergence dynamics. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 In our study due to data limitations we could not make a distinction between ‘greenfield’ and 
‘brownfield’ subsidiaries. There are reasons to believe that this distinction may be important 
as ‘brownfield’ subsidiaries, because of their origins, can be expected to have relatively 
greater similarity to host country institutions. In reality there are many examples when 
‘brownfields’ are very similar to ‘greenfields’ in everything but the legal incidence as the 
foreign investor completely replaces plant and equipment, labour and the product line after 
acquisition (see for example Child et al., 2000). We believe therefore that while 
‘brownfield’/‘greenfield’ dichotomy would have enriched our study we have not missed any 
substantial variation by not taking this dichotomy into account within the present paper. 
  
2 Because in this paper we compare parent firms with their foreign subsidiaries it was 
necessary to adjust our index for this special case. This is most noticeable in dealing with the 
financial element in the coordination dimension ‘corporate governance’. To include in our 
analysis only relevant subsidiaries, respondents were asked two separate questions to assess 
this index element: a) Banks are an important source of financing, and b) Capital markets are 
an important source of financing. Subsidiaries that provided a ‘no’ answer to both questions 
were excluded from the sample for this index element on the assumption that these 
subsidiaries are financed through their parent firms rather than through own financing 
initiatives. In so doing, we achieve robustness of our results when setting parent firms against 
subsidiaries. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
            
            
  Subsidiary  
Parent 
Firm 
       
  Yes No  Yes No 
Industrial relations (IR)      
 1. Membership in an employers’ or other industry association. 22 123  84 36 
 2. Union input and/or bargaining at the industry and/or firm-level. 13 129  83 33 
 3. Unionized workforce. 23 121  83 25 
 4. Permanent work contracts prevail over fixed-term contracts. 126 17  88 19 
 
5. Employment contracts contain notice periods no shorter than 
90 days. 35 108  37 61 
       
Employee relations (ER)      
 
1. Active works council or comparable employee representation 
body. 30 115  104 18 
 
2. Co-determination with employee representatives in decision-
making. 27 117  58 53 
 3. Employee share ownership schemes in place. 12 132  32 92 
 4. Operates performance-related pay schemes. 98 43  87 28 
 5. Operates employee consultation schemes. 107 39  99 20 
       
Training and education (TE)      
 1. Special employee training schemes in place. 88 54  112 10 
 2. Systematically trains employees in firm-specific skills. 116 28  110 12 
 3. Systematically trains employees in industry-specific skills. 93 47  101 18 
 4. Poaching of employees is a significant threat to the business. 73 67  68 43 
 5. Vocational training schemes are in place. 58 78  104 9 
       
Corporate governance (CG)      
 
1. More attention is paid to the long term objectives rather than to 
current earnings. 95 38  82 27 
 2a. Banks are an important source of financing. 19 122  48 61 
 2b. Capital Markets are an important source of financing. 3 137  28 81 
 3. Investors usually commit on a long-term basis. 82 35  84 17 
 
4. Management agrees key decisions with supervisory boards that 
include employees and major shareholders.    51 84  89 25 
 
5. At least one of the shareholders holds more than 10% of voting 
rights. 91 32  98 16 
       
Inter-firm relations (IFR)      
 1. Technology transfer with firms other than parent/subsidiary.  49 90  73 37 
 2. Joint R&D programs with organizations other than 36 102  78 34 
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parent/subsidiary. 
 3. Merged with or acquired another firm in the past three years. 26 110  63 51 
 
4. Cross-shareholdings with companies other than 
parent/subsidiary. 8 126  24 82 
 
5. Co-operation with external organizations in industry standard-
setting. 52 84  72 37 
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Table 2 
The Variables 
  
Variable Description 
 
Central Variables 
      
S_INST Index of institutional impact, German subsidiaries in the UK 
P_INST Index of institutional impact, German parent firms 
S_INST_RATIO Ratio of institutional impact, German subsidiaries in the UK 
P_INST_RATIO Ratio of institutional impact, German parent firms 
LOG_S_AGE Natural logarithm of subsidiary company age in 
2007.  
S_FIRMSIZE Natural logarithm of the total number of employees at the 
subsidiary level at the time of survey.  
S_PROD 
 
Equals one if the subsidiary is a production facility and zero 
otherwise. 
S_MANUF Equals one if the subsidiary's industry classification is 
‘manufacturing’ and zero otherwise. 
S_REPRESENT Index value measuring the relative intensity of representation 
of parent company in subsidiary management: 0 (parent 
company representation is weak to non-existent). The index 
is formed by adding one when: (1) subsidiary management is 
at least partly provided by the parent firm, (2) parent 
company has representatives on the subsidiary's management 
board, (3) parent firm representatives hold line management 
functions in the subsidiary firm, and (4) parent company 
representatives are among subsidiary staff other than 
management. 
S_FINNEED Equals one if, in financial years 2004-2006, the subsidiary 
experienced negative net earnings and/or situations in which 
it relied on special purpose parent firm financing.  
  
  
Control variables 
      
LOG_P_AGE Natural logarithm of subsidiary company age in 2007. 
P_FIRMSIZE Natural logarithm of the total number of employees at the 
parent firm level at the time of survey. 
P_COUNTRIES Number of countries in which the firm operates. 
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Table 3 
Index of Institutional Impact and Ratio of Institutional Impact by Subsidiary/Parent 
              
 
Overall 
Industrial 
Relations 
Employee 
Relations 
Corporate 
Governance 
Training and 
Education 
Inter-Firm 
Relations 
Panel A: Institutional Impact Scores 
Index of Institutional 
Impact 
N  49 79 97 79 100 88 
Subsidiary 11.26 1.61 2.38 2.79 3.01 1.40 
Parent Firm  16.79 3.33 3.20 3.60 3.92 2.73 
Ratio of Institutional 
Impact  
N  137 127 128 123 122 123 
Subsidiary  0.45 0.32 0.48 0.64 0.60 0.27 
Parent Firm  0.69 0.69 0.64 0.78 0.80 0.57 
       
Panel B: Differences in Institutional Impact Scores 
Index -5.53*** -1.72*** -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.91*** -1.33*** 
Ratio -0.25*** -0.37*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.20*** -0.30*** 
       
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Subsidiary Index of Institutional Impact and Ratio of Institutional Impact by Subsidiary Size, Subsidiary Age and Subsidiary 
Function 
              
 
Overall 
Industrial 
Relations 
Employee 
Relations 
Corporate 
Governance 
Training and 
Education 
Inter-Firm 
Relations 
Panel A: Institutional Impact Scores by Subsidiary Size 
 
Index of Institutional 
Impact 
N  80 132 137 98 130 124 
Mean no. of employees 512.96 394.01 374.79 447.03 399.68 395.75 
Ó 2,381.38 1,892.24 1,857.87 2,157.54 1906.28 1950.40 
‘Small’ subsidiary  9.79 1.29 2.29 2.54 2.43 0.81 
‘Big’ subsidiary  12.23 1.77 2.45 2.84 3.54 1.66 
Difference -2.44*** -0.58*** -0.16 -0.30 -1.11*** -0.85*** 
 
Ratio of Institutional 
Impact 
N  148 147 147 143 144 143 
Mean no. of employees 358.58 359.93 359.93 368.39 365.19 366.40 
Ó 1,789.54 1,795.58 1,795.58 1,819.86 1813.84 1820.04 
‘Small’ subsidiary  0.38 0.26 0.45 0.60 0.49 0.18 
‘Big’ subsidiary  0.51 0.36 0.50 0.67 0.72 0.33 
Difference  -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.05* -0.07 -0.23*** -0.15*** 
       
Panel B: Institutional Impact Scores by Subsidiary Operational Function 
 
Index of Institutional 
Impact 
N  80 133 138 98 131 125 
 33 
Non-production facility  10.37 1.34 2.29 2.68 2.75 1.09 
Production facility 12.93 2.03 2.54 2.72 3.64 1.58 
Difference -2.56*** -0.69*** -0.25 -0.05 -0.89*** -0.49** 
 
Ratio of Institutional 
Impact 
N  149 148 148 144 145 144 
Non-production facility 0.41 0.27 0.45 0.63 0.54 0.23 
Production facility  0.52 0.40 0.53 0.63 0.79 0.33 
Difference -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.08** -0.00 -0.20*** -0.10** 
       
Panel C: Subsidiary Index of Institutional Impact Scores by Subsidiary Age 
 
Index of Institutional 
Impact 
N  77 129 134 95 128 122 
Mean subsidiary age 
(yrs) 
30.94  28.74  29.13 29.92 29.50 29.45 
ó  (yrs) 31.37 25.72 27.72 28.64 28.16 28.65 
‘New’ subsidiary  10.47 1.32 2.32 2.68 2.92 1.00 
‘Established’ subsidiary  11.50 1.77 2.42 2.68 3.02 1.47 
Difference -1.03 -0.45*** -0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.47** 
 
Ratio of Institutional 
Impact 
N  145 144 144 141 142 141 
Mean subsidiary age 
(yrs) 
28.99  29.13  29.13 28.80  29.26 29.18 
ó  (yrs) 27.49  27.53 27.53  27.18 27.70 27.75 
‘New’ subsidiary  0.41 0.27 0.46 0.62 0.57 0.21 
‘Established’ subsidiary  0.47 0.36 0.49 0.64 0.63 0.30 
Difference -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09* 
              
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results for Subsidiary Institutional Index Scores 
  
Independent 
Variables 
Overall IR ER CG TE IFR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Index of Institutional Impact 
CONST 2.541 0.939 1.453** 1.425 -0.443 -1.871* 
P_INST 0.142 0.105 0.481*** 0.440*** 0.601*** 0.174 
LOG_S_AGE -0.369 0.205 -0.087 -0.139 -0.035 0.031 
S_FIRMSIZE 1.007*** 0.234** -0.085 0.196* 0.321*** 0.580*** 
S_PROD 2.002** 0.867*** 0.491** 0.002 0.112 -0.260 
S_REPRESENT 0.477 -0.099 0.021 -0.315** 0.176 -0.129 
S_FINNEED 1.363 0.171 0.340 0.070 0.719** -0.221 
S_MANUF 0.063 0.092 -0.198 -0.164 0.568* -0.053 
N 41 60 76 65 78 73 
Adjusted R² 0.490 0.348 0.235 0.204 0.439 0.308 
Panel B: Ratio of Institutional Impact 
CONST 0.102 0.217 0.297** 0.073 -0.159 -0.372** 
P_INST_RATIO 0.155** 0.071 0.491*** 0.442*** 0.562*** 0.161* 
LOG_S_AGE 0.002 0.035 -0.042 0.010 -0.014 -0.001 
S_FIRMSIZE 0.046*** 0.044*** -0.003 0.038 0.067*** 0.098*** 
S_PROD 0.054* 0.104** -0.064 -0.008 0.045 0.011 
S_REPRESENT 0.015 0.006 0.003 -0.002 0.035 -0.015 
S_FINNEED 0.061** 0.023 0.035 0.063 0.160 -0.041 
S_MANUF 0.032 0.039 -0.019 0.032 0.114** -0.011 
N 104 96 96 95 95 94 
Adjusted R² 0.416 0.222 0.246 0.0814 0.434 0.286 
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***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Notes Table 5: 
1 All model ÷² are significant at 1% level, except for corporate governance in Panel B, which is significant at 10% level. 
2 A negative coefficient indicates that the characteristic adds to the subsidiary’s being more akin to the archetypal LME firm. 
3 Controls include parent firm age (LOG_P_AGE), parent firm headcount (P_FIRMSIZE), number of countries in which the firm operates 
(P_COUNTRIES). 
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Appendix 1 
Table of Correlations 
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S_INST   1.000000        
P_INST   0.344394  1.000000       
LOG_S_AGE   0.089474  0.291495  1.000000      
S_FIRMSIZE   0.598684  0.232136  0.229318  1.000000     
S_PROD   0.507688  0.262222  0.329035  0.272184  1.000000    
S_REPRESENT   0.269365  0.104483 -0.059923  0.401447 -0.141314  1.000000   
S_FINEED  -0.012642 -0.101861 -0.110998 -0.043548 -0.179487  0.019854  1.000000  
S_MANUF  0.113356 0.241947 0.164152 -0.088042 0.365598 -0.334764 -0.117664 1.000000 
          
 
 
